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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 1 August 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


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
SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS










from last week's 77.







August week's 214. The total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than figures released to the press by the GVN.







August plus a "gap fill" for a total of over 1,500 personnel. The estimated number of infiltrators since 23 October 1969 is now 63,500 - 65,000.







ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS increased sharply to 763 from August last week's 589 but were mostly of a minor nature.





ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION decreased significantly to 1,278 from last week's 2,240, and is the lowest number since 27 July 1968 when 1,146 enemy were killed.





August of enemy killed by RVN forces rose to 75% from last week's 72%.

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Enemy-initiated action continued at a low level throughout most of South Vietnam. Some indications point to an increase in activity during the coming week, but it will probably be limited to I Military Region. Any such increase will probably consist mainly of scattered indirect fire attacks and light ground probes as the enemy attempts to draw Allied forces away from populated areas.

The relative quiet of the recent past in north Laos was shattered at the end of the week when enemy forces overran government positions southwest of the Plain of Jars in an unusually heavy attack shortly after the Pathet Lao emissary, Souk Vongsak, arrived in Vientiane. The attacks were probably not only launched as a show of strength in support of the envoy, but also as an attempt to forestall General Vang Pao's offensive scheduled to begin shortly in this critical area. To the south, light enemy harassing attacks continued in the Bolovens Plateau, but a more aggressive posture by the recently reinforced government forces in the Khong Island area is likely to draw strong Communist reaction.

In Cambodia, the lull in enemy activity ended at week's end when Communist forces attacked and temporarily held key installations within Kompong Thom. Air support assisted defenders in repelling the attack, but Cambodian intelligence officers estimate that at least 4,000 enemy surround the province capital. To the south, enemy forces also attacked and captured Skoun. Reinforcements from Kompong Cham have moved to join government forces located north of Skoun. The government drive to retake Kirirom remains stalled pending the arrival of additional units from Phnom Penh. Meanwhile, small-scale attacks by the Communists in southern and western Cambodia have maintained pressure on friendly installations and lines of communication. Senior Cambodian officers are currently concerned about the security of Phnom Penh and Pochentong Air Base as indications have been noted that the enemy may exert pressure around the capital or attempt an attack on the city itself.

Enemy Infiltration

The two battalion-size groups detected during the past week and an accepted "gap fill" bring to six the number of full-size infiltration groups which have started southward since 23 July. Since all six groups are destined for the same area (VC MR 5), it seems unlikely that their movement signals the beginning of a new surge in countrywide infiltration, but rather that they are to provide reinforcements or replacements for this specific area only. Since 23 October 1969, the total number of infiltrators is estimated at 63,500 - 65,000.

South Vietnam Developments

The break between President Thieu and Vice President Ky now seems beyond repair. Ky has been sulking ever since Thieu pre-empted his self-appointed role as manager of South Vietnam's relations with Cambodia, and the rift has widened following a public exchange between the two leaders. In response to Ky's charges that the top leadership was corrupt, self-serving, and incompetent, Thieu counterattacked last week by describing the 1967 election with Ky as "a forced marriage" and, in effect, calling Ky's statements pure lies. South Vietnamese observers have characterized the exchange as "childish" and believe that both men have lost respect. Although Ky's intemperate remarks were probably motivated largely by pique, he may also have decided that he has nothing to lose by adopting the role of a spoiler in preparation for the 1971 presidential elections. One of his closest advisors has quit him, and one of his supporters in the army has indicated he and several other generals probably would not follow Ky if he decides to go into the opposition camp which they regard as "Communist-leaning."

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Communist Developments

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that the North Vietnamese are in an aggressive mood.

Shcherbakov was Irankly discouraged about Hanoi's current hard line and admitted that there was very little the Soviets could do about it. Shcherbakov Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000100040005-5

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described the North Vietnamese as "rigid, hardened in their own line, committed to their own path and policy, and obdurate." Meanwhile, the

North Vietnamese were in a very uncompromising mood. The comments of reinforce other indications that Hanoi 25X1X4

is apparently not interested in serious negotiations at this time.

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